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ROBINSON & RULE VI: LEGITIMATE
RULE-MAKING OR JUDICIAL LEGISLATION?
C. Rabon Martin*
On November 23, 1976, the Oklahoma Supreme Court denied an
application for a writ of prohibition directed at the judges of the Okla-
homa Court of Criminal Appeals. In Wofford v. Bussey,1 the peti-
tioner complained that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had
exercised jurisdiction over an appeal by the state which was not author-
ized by statute. At the preliminary hearing, Wofford was ordered held
for trial, but the charge was dismissed at the district court arraignment
for insufficient evidence. The district attorney then filed an appeal
with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals pursuant to the court's
Rule VI2 The court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the
case for further prosecution, 3 whereupon Wofford sought the prohibi-
tion writ, arguing that the appeal of the dismissal of his case was not
authorized by statute, and that the Court of Criminal Appeals therefore
lacked jurisdiction.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court denied the writ on the rationale
that the Oklahoma Constitution grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction
in criminal cases to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.4 The
Supreme Court noted that "[t]he argument is simply that the Court
of Criminal Appeals has proceeded in excess of its jurisdiction; such
being the case, and without more, the question is clearly beyond the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court."5
Wofford raises two intriguing questions. First, has the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals in fact exceeded its jurisdiction? Second,
* Partner, Baker, Baker & Martin, Tulsa, Oklahoma; B.S., University of Tulsa; J.
D., The University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. 556 P.2d 1280 (Okla. 1976).
2. OKLA. C0m. R. VI.
3. State v. Wofford, 549 P.2d 823 (Okla. Crim. 1976).
4. Oa .. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
5. 556 P.2d at 1281.
1
Martin: Robinson & Rule VI: Legitimate Rule-Making or Judicial Legislatio
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
and more important, if that court has exceeded its jurisdiction, prohibi-
tion being unavailable, what is the appropriate remedy?
JURISDICTIONAL ASPECTS
Rule VI provides as follows:
The State of Oklahoma. . . shall have the right to appeal
an adverse ruling, or order, of a magistrate sustaining a
Motion to Suppress Evidence, Quashing an Information,
Sustaining a Plea to the Jurisdiction or Demurrer to Informa-
tion, or an Order Discharging Defendant at preliminary ex-
amination because of Insufficiency of the Evidence to estab-
lish either that a crime has been committed, or there is prob-
able cause that the accused has committed a felony.
The court's rules provide that the state may first appeal the magistrate's
ruling to a district judge and, if the ruling is sustained, may appeal
directly to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals." This language
strikes a sharp contrast with the Oklahoma statutes which mandate that:
Appeals to the Criminal Court of Appeals may be taken by
the State in the following cases and no other:
1. Upon judgment for the defendant on quashing or
setting aside an indictment or information.
2. Upon an Order of the Court arresting the judgment.
3. Upon a question reserved by the State.7
The apparent conflict between the directives of the statute and Rule
VI has not been explained by the court of criminal appeals.
The history of Rule VI began with the 1931 decision of State v.
Newell," where the court of criminal appeals held that the statutes
establishing time limits for appeals in criminal cases apply equally to
both the defendant and the state; thus, the state's attempt to appeal
a reserved question of law more than six months after acquittal was
dismissed. This rather innocuous ruling lay dormant for the next forty-
one years.
In the meantime, problems frequently arose over criminal charges
being refiled by district attorneys after dismissal at preliminary hearings
because of insufficient evidence. Since jeopardy had not yet attached,
a district attorney could refile as many times as he chose until he ob-
tained a favorable ruling. In 1970, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
6. OKLA. Camm. R. 6.1 to 6.5.
7. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1053 (1958) (emphasis added).
8. 52 Okla. Crim. 5, 2P.2d280 (1931).
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Appeals, then comprised of Judges Nix, Brett and Bussey, moved to
end this abuse. In Nicodemus v. District Court,9 the court condemned
the practice of "judge shopping," holding that refiling required the state
to show that new evidence existed which would overcome the reason
for the prior dismissal.' 0 This requirement was expanded in Jones v.
State," where the court explained that "new evidence" meant evidence
not known to the state at the first preliminary hearing, or which could
not have been easily acquired at that time. Judge Bussey dissented,
expressing his belief that the state should have a right to appeal to the
district court, in the same manner as the defendant may have, the suffi-
ciency of the evidence reviewed by filing a motion to quash."2 In
Harper v. District Court'3 the court held a district judge powerless to
interfere with a magistrate's disposition of a case at the preliminary
hearing. Again, Judge Bussey dissented.
By 1972, composition of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
had changed. Judge Nix had left the court and was replaced by Judge
Simms. Shortly thereafter, the court decided State v. Caldwell.' At
a preliminary hearing an examining magistrate had sustained a motion
to suppress, and the district attorney sought a writ of mandamus or pro-
hibition to block the dismissal. Although denying the writ on the basis
that extraordinary writs cannot control the exercise of judicial discre-
tion, the court went on to give birth to Rule VI with the following in-
troduction:
The defendant who receives an adverse ruling from a
magistrate, has the unquestioned right to have the identical
issue presented to a District Judge .... The State has
neither a procedure, nor a forum, to assert a co-equal right.
As a matter of deep public interest and to more nearly
achieve a true balance of the scales of criminal justice, we
are therefore called upon to re-examine this Court's position
in Nicodemus, Jones and Harper, and do hereby adopt the
following rule .- . .. 5
The only authority offered by the court for this extraordinary action
was the 1931 Newell holding that statutory time limits for appeals apply
to both the state and the defendant.' 6
9. 473 P.2d 312 (Okla. Crim. 1970).
10. Id. at 316.
11. 482 P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. 1971).
12. Id. at 175.
13. 484 P.2d 891 (Okla. Crim. 1971).
14. 498 P.2d 426 (Okla. Crim. 1972).
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Since the legislature has not statutorily provided the avenues of
appeal made available to the state by Rule VI, the only question remain-
ing is whether or not the rule-making powers of the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals are sufficiently broad to enable that court to create
modes of procedure for district court appeals in addition to those au-
thorized by statute. The rule-making power of the court of criminal
appeals is defined by statute: "Said court and judges thereof shall have
the power to. . .prescribe and promulgate such rules for the govern-
ment of said court as it may deem necessary."'17 This rule-making
power was construed as early as 1909 in Yandell v. Territory 8 and as
recently as 1944 in Denton v. Hunt 9 as the power to make reasonable
rules for regulation of practice before the court of criminal appeals.
The jurisdiction of any court depends upon the constitutional or
statutory provisions creating it and defining the limits of its jurisdiction.
No "rule" can enlarge or expand this jurisdiction. As the United States
Supreme Court said in United States v. Sherwood, 2  "[aln authority
conferred upon a court to make rules of procedure for the exercise of
its jurisdiction is not an authority to enlarge that jurisdiction."' 21 Thus,
it would seem that the procedural modes created by Rule VI are neither
authorized by statute nor within either the delegated or inherent rule-
making powers of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.
In December of 1975, after Rule VI had been in force for three
and one-half*years, another problem for district attorneys arose. Rule
VI afforded the state an opportunity to take the merits of a search issue
before the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals if a motion to suppress
was sustained by an examining magistrate and upheld by a district
judge; however, Rule VI did not apply where a motion to suppress was
overruled at the preliminary hearing but then sustained at a district
arraignment. Likewise, no statutory appeal was afforded the state
under such circumstances. This prosecutorial burden was lifted by the
court of criminal appeals in State v. Robinson.22  In Robinson, the
Tulsa County District Attorney attempted to appeal the merits of a
search issue after a district court judge had sustained a motion to sup-
press and dismissed the case. The court of criminal appeals dismissed
17. OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 41 (1962).
18. 3 Okla. Crim. 188, 104 P. 923 (1909).
19. 79 Okla. Crim. 166, 152 P.2d 698 (1944).
20. 312 U.S. 584 (1940).
21. Id. at 589-90.
22. 544 P.2d 545 (Okla. Crim. 1975).
[Vol. 12:503
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the attempted appeal as unauthorized by statute.23 However, after dis-
posing of the issues, the court proceeded to enact another new rule,
decreeing:
In all future cases where the criminal prosecution has been
dismissed. . after the trial court has sustained a motion to
suppress. . . such dismissal will not bar the refiling of a new
information, but in the event the case be refiled it should not
be re-assigned to the same judge who has previously ruled
on the motion to suppress, and the judge to whom such case
is assigned will not be bound by the prior ruling on the
motion to suppress. . . [But] the State may not, for the
second time, refile the information . . . .24
Thus, the state was afforded the procedural equivalent of an appeal
through the relitigation of the merits of the search issue before a dif-
ferent judge.
Aside from the difficulty which Robinson shares with Rule VI re-
garding the authority of the court of criminal appeals to create or
change procedural modes of practice in the district courts, the case
raises another important question. Robinson permits relitigation of a
search issue at the same level of the judicial hierarchy, but before a dif-
ferent judge in a new proceeding. Just as relitigation of a cause of action
is barred by the doctrine of res adjudicata, relitigation of conclusive
issues is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In Ashe v.
Swenson,2 5 the United States Supreme Court held that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel is embodied in the fifth amendment guarantee
against double jeopardy and is enforceable against the states through
the fourteenth amendment. The recent decision of United States v.
Regan 2 1 held Ashe applicable to suppression of evidence.
In summary, it appears that the rule-making power of the Okla-
homa Court of Criminal Appeals has been invoked in Rule VI and
Robinson in a manner inconsistent with the court's statutory appellate
jurisdiction and the United States Constitution. The "rule" of Robin-
son, that in the second judge hearing a search issue is not bound by
the ruling of the first, is inconsistent with the constitutional doctrine
of collateral estoppel.
23. OxLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1053 (1958).
24. 544 P.2d at 551.
25. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
26. 528 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, - U.S. -.
1977]
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REMEDIES AVAILABLE
If the court of criminal appeals has in fact exceeded its jurisdic-
tion, the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Wofford v. Bussey
raises an important question; if the supreme court has no jurisdiction
to determine if the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has exceeded
its jurisdiction, what other remedy is appropriate? Several possibilities
exist.
State Habeas Corpus
Although the court of criminal appeals has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction in criminal cases, habeas corpus is a civil proceeding and
habeas petitions may be considered by the Oklahoma Supreme Court,
as well as the court of criminal appeals17 Accordingly, if the issue
of whether the court of criminal appeals exceeded its jurisdiction
through enacting Rule VI or the Robinson refiling procedure was pre-
sented by means of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the lack of
jurisdiction which resulted in the denial of the writ of prohibition in
Wofford would no longer preclude the supreme court from deciding
the question. However, the supreme court's declaration in Wofford
that the court of criminal appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
to determine its own jurisdiction indicates that the supreme court could
deny a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the same grounds. This
apparent conflict between jurisdiction to hear an application for a writ
of habeas corpus and the lack of jurisdiction to determine the jurisdic-
tion of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals must still be resolved.
Judging from the language in Wofford, it certainly seems that the su-
preme court would be disinclined to pass upon the issue, even if pre-
sented via habeas corpus.
Prohibition and Habeas Corpus Before the Court of Criminal Appeals
It is unlikely that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals would
rule that it exceeded its own jurisdictional limitations in enacting Rule
VI and the Robinson refiling procedure, although this remains as one
avenue of possible relief. In the past, the court has declined to assume
original jurisdiction and entertain the merits of the question of issuing
a writ of prohibition against the Tulsa County District Court. s Accord-
27. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1333 (1961); see Ex parte Deickman, 33 Okla. 749, 127
P. 1077 (1912).
28. See State v. Elies, No. CRF-76-2187 (Okla. Crim., filed Sept. 9, 1976).
[Vol. 12:503
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ingly, it is safe to assume that subsequent applications would be
similarly rejected. Prudence would suggest, however, that this remedy
be attempted before pursuing the option below.
Federal Habeas Corpus
Assuming that the court of criminal appeals has exceeded its juris-
diction in enacting Rule VI and Robinson, and assuming an individual
successfully defended a criminal charge to a stage where he would be
entitled to his freedom as far as the Oklahoma Statutes were concerned,
but was restrained of his liberty under Rule VI or Robinson, that indi-
vidual would presumably be entitled to federal habeas corpus relief. 29
Existence of a federal question, the first requirement for federal
relief, is easily satisfied under the terms of the habeas corpus statute
itself. Section 2254(d)(4) provides for the issuance of the writ if the
state court that is depriving the defendant of his liberty lacks jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter or the person of the applicant. Additional
potential federal questions include deprivation of liberty without due
process of law, which requires a full and fair hearing before a tribunal
empowered to grant relief; infringement of the doctrine of separation
of powers in violation of the constitutional guarantee that all states shall
have a republican form of government; and, as to Robinson, violation
of the constitutional prohibition against relitigation of conclusive issues.
The real question regarding the availability of federal habeas
corpus relief is that of exhaustion of state remedies. Simply stated,
the question is whether a state prisoner who has won a discharge at
a preliminary examination or at a district court arraignment, but who
has not been freed because of further prosecution pursuant to Rule VI
or the Robinson refiling procedure, must endure the second prosecu-
tion to its ultimate conclusion, bearing the expenses thereof, before ap-
plying to a federal court for habeas corpus relief? The answer appears
to be that he need not. The United States Supreme Court, in Reed
v. Beto,30 and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sandoval v. Rod-
riguez,31 have held that where the highest court of a state passed upon
the federal issues raised by the applicant, in a manner adverse to the
applicant, he need not seek further relief in the state courts; immediate
29. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 conditions relief under federal law on the satisfaction of two
requirements: (1) the existence of a federal question and (2) the exhaustion of state
remedies.
30. 385 U.S. 554 (1965); reh. denied, 386 U.S. 969 (1967).
31. 461 F.2d 1097 (10th Cir. 1972).
19771
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habeas corpus relief in the federal courts is available if his claim has
merit. Since Rule VI and Robinson were created at the highest court
level of this state, such action would be equivalent to a decision uphold-
ing those rules and immediate federal habeas corpus relief should be
available, particularly if state prohibition were denied.
The final issue remaining concerns the stage of a prosecution, pur-
suant to Rule VI and Robinson, at which the federal question arises.
Under Rule VI, the federal question would apparently arise as soon as
an order of dismissal was entered by an examining magistrate, since
under state statutes the defendant would be entitled to immediate re-
lease, but would be retained in custody pending the state's "appeal"
of the magistrate's ruling to a district judge. Under Robinson's refil-
ing procedure, however, a different situation is presented. When a dis-
trict judge sustains a motion to suppress, the state may proceed to trial
without the evidence which was suppressed and appeal the search issue
after the defendant's acquittal on a reserved question of law. The de-
fendant is discharged upon acquittal, regardless of the outcome of the
appeal. However, if the state requests a dismissal following the sus-
taining of a motion to suppress and the dismissal is granted by the
court,32 the state is permitted to refile.33  Under Robinson, of course,
the new evidence requirement of Nicodemus and Jones need not be
met, but the failure to do so does not give rise to a federal question,
since the defendant can win his release under existing state remedies
by convincing the second district judge to rule consistently with the
first. However, once the second district judge upholds the search in
derogation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a federal question ex-
ists and federal habeas corpus relief would be available.
CONCLUSION
In Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 4 Justice Holmes offered the
following distinction between legislative and judicial action:
A judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and enforces liabili-
ties as they stand on present or past facts and under laws sup-
posed already to exist. That is its purpose and end. Legis-
lation on the other hand looks to the future and changes ex-
isting conditions by making a new rule to be applied there-
after to all or some part of those subject to its power."8
32. O=K. STAT. tit 22, § 815 (1969).
33. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 817 (1969).
34. 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
35. Id. at 226.
510 [Vol. 12:503
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Rule VI was adopted "[a]s a matter of deep public interest and to
more nearly achieve a true balance of the scales of criminal justice."3 6
Robinson's refiling procedure was implemented following the Okla-
homa Court of Criminal Appeals' observation that "a persuasive argu-
ment may be made on behalf of the people that an appeal from an
order sustaining a motion to suppress should be authorized without
jeopardy having attached. '3 7 Both Rule VI and Robinson appear to
have been created by the court of criminal appeals to fill what was be-
lieved to be a void in Oklahoma's statutory scheme of criminal proce-
dure. The question of whether this is improper judicial legislation will
probably be decided eventually by a federal court, pursuant to an appli-
cation for a writ of habeas corpus from a defendant aggrieved by Rule
VI or Robinson.
36. 498 P.2d at 428.
37. 544 P.2d at 550.
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